

Outline for a book:

NASSER: THE MAN, THE PLAN, THE METHOD

Attached is a 28-page outline which I hope to expand into a book of approximately 200 pages. The purpose of the book is to provide the reader with a clear understanding of Nasser's philosophy, the nature of his plan of aggrandizement as stated in his book "Egypt's Revolution," and the techniques he ^{has developed} ~~will~~ use to achieve these ends. The attached outline covers events up to July, 1957. However, the finished book will cover events to the very latest ^{date}, and will attempt to provide some sort of basis ^{from} ~~for~~ ~~with~~ which to judge events that come after.

Nasserism is by far the most volatile of the political forces working on the international scene, and as yet there has been no book on the subject. There have been many articles about Nasser and Arab nationalism, but no book has been written which attempts to delineate Nasser's philosophy according to what the man himself has written and said. This is what I shall do in this book, using as a basis all the original sources available.

The book I envisage will cover as many facets of Arab and Mideast politics as possible: geopolitics, oil, Israel, Western interests, Russian penetration, etc. It will also provide possible keys to the future.

It will take about two and a half months for the book to be completed.

NASSER:
THE MAN, THE PLAN, THE METHOD

An Analysis of "Egypt's Liberation"

by

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In Dorothy Thompson's introduction to "Egypt's Liberation"—Nasser's testament on the Egyptian revolution, of which he was the moving force—she writes of the dictator: "The task of the transformer is beyond the lifetime of any single man, and the weak, seeking to guide a simultaneous national and social revolution will quickly abandon it in disillusionment. But Abdul Nasser is not weak because he is not blood-thirsty. He appears in these pages as one who can draw a new breath and gain new insights out of initial disillusionment; . . .

"The struggle is never over. But he who can master corruption without being corrupted, can wield power without installing tyranny, and can master events without losing his own soul is a hero in history.

"So far this man remains pure. Pure, faithful, and brave."

^(Dorothy Thompson) That was written in 1955. Since then the world has had much time in which to know Nasser. In that interval he has done nothing incompatible with what he set down in the book he wrote ^{in 1954} ~~several years ago~~. In fact, using this book as a guide, one can reasonably predict what will be Nasser's course in the future. For revealed in its pages is the nature of the man himself, in a state of perpetual and obstinate rebellion against all manner and form of authority represented by the West, and hungrily preoccupied with the idea of power. "Egypt's Liberation"

still remains the most coherent and comprehensive statement Nasser has made on the aims of the Egyptian Revolution. In it is a blueprint for Egypt's future. Behind it all is a burning ambition to build Egypt into one of the powerful nations of the world, subservient to no one, and exerting its influence and leadership over all Africa, the entire Middle East, and the vast Islamic world.

To understand the origins of this ambitious plan, one must start with the planner. Nasser's life is that of a man to whom being Egyptian is more important than anything else in the world. All his life he has identified himself emotionally with Egypt. His own personal rebellion has become the rebellion of Egypt against its masters.

The Man

Gamal Abdul Nasser was born in a small town in Upper Egypt in 1918. He came from a good middle class family and at the age of eight his father sent him to Cairo for an education. In that same year, his mother died. According to his official Egyptian embassy "biographer," her loss deeply affected him and tended to increase his "natural propensity for privacy and contemplation." His hatred of the English seems to have been a natural national inheritance, and like so many Egyptian youngsters, he too shouted whenever he saw a plane in the sky: "Ya 'Azeez, Ya 'Azeez. Dahiya takhud al-Ingleez." ("O, Almighty God, may disaster take the English!") That phrase had been used for many decades in Egypt, first against the Turks-- substitute Turks for English--and then against the English.

Nasser became politically active at a very early age, and at ~~the age~~

On 17, in 1935, we find him marching with and often leading the demonstrators clamoring for the restoration of the 1923 Constitution. It was also about then he began to feel that demonstrations and shouting were not enough. Action was needed, Nasser writes, "to demand that the leaders of Egypt unite to agree upon a single policy." Indeed, they did agree and brought forth the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, which still kept British troops in Egypt. By then Nasser had become personally dedicated to the idea of saving Egypt from British imperialism and the Egyptians who profited from it. He writes: "I confess that to my excited imagination at that time political assassinations appeared to be the positive action we had to adopt if we were to rescue the future of our country. I considered the assassination of many individuals, having decided that they were the main obstacles which lay between our beloved country and its destined greatness. I began to study their crimes and to take it upon myself to judge the harmfulness of their actions." However, he changed his mind about assassinations after shooting someone ^{Taking a shot at} and then suffering unbearable pangs of conscience. "I did not sleep all night," he writes, "but what else could we have done?" After a few hours of torment the new answer came: "Our method must be changed. What we have been doing," he said to himself, "is not positive action to which we are dedicated. The problem has roots that are deep, and is too profound to be approached in this negative way. I felt a serene inner relief." Luckily, too, the victim lived.

The method which Nasser and his fellow conspirators finally decided on was "a revolution springing from the heart of the people, expressing

their hopes, following the same path they had already envisioned as the great highway to freedom." The events of July 23, 1952, in which King Farouk, whom Nasser refers to as the "masked stooge" of the imperialists, was ousted, was the first step in that revolution.

In 1937, at the age of 19, Nasser entered Military College. He does not tell us what especially drew him to a military life, except that he had a deep sense of duty toward his country. On graduating from Military College, he joined a rifle brigade and was transferred to Mankbad in Asuit, where he met Anwar Al Sadat, Zakaria Mohie El Din—both of whom in future years were to become members of the Revolution Command Council—and Ahmed Anwar, who is today Chief of the Military Police. It would seem that in planning Egypt's future, these men were also planning their own, for they have become Egypt's ruling clique and now have a very real economic interest in seeing that they remain in power. Every dictator gathers around him a loyal army of beneficiaries whose fortunes become inextricably linked to the fortune of the leader. In Egypt, it is Nasser's army comrades who form the most loyal ~~and~~ inner circle of beneficiaries, claiming the most important portfolios and wielding considerable personal power.

In 1939, Nasser was transferred to Alexandria, where he met Abdul Hakim Amer, who was to become his best friend and also a member of the Revolution Command Council. Then, in 1942, Nasser became a teacher at the Military College and later entered the Army Staff College from which

he graduated with honors. He also managed to marry and have five children, two daughters and three sons, one of whom is named after his friend, Hakim Amer.

During the war in Palestine in 1948, Nasser went through another crucial stage in his development. It was not certain at first whether Egypt would go to war against the Jews. But Nasser was so eager to get into the growing battle that he tendered his resignation from the Army in order to fight as a volunteer. His resignation was rejected, but Egypt soon entered the war anyway, and Nasser, with high hopes for vengeance at last, fervently went into battle. Several ^{months} weeks later, surrounded by the Israelis in the famous Faluja trap, Nasser thought while sitting in the trenches: "Here we are, in these foxholes, surrounded, and thrust treacherously into a battle for which we were not ready, our lives the playthings of greed, conspiracy and lust, which have left us here weaponless under fire." (It is interesting to note that this theme of betrayal on the home front was also one of Hitler's in "Mein Kampf," when he wrote of Germany's defeat in World War I.) But to Nasser, Egypt as a whole was one big Faluja. "Egypt too is besieged by difficulties and enemies; she has been deceived and forced into a battle for which she was not ready, her fate the toy of greed, conspiracy and lust, which left her without weapons underfire."

It was at this juncture that the actual idea of a revolution to overthrow the corrupt Farouk monarchy began to form. Nasser hated the English, but even more he hated those Egyptians in the regime who refused to throw the English out. Thus, in order to get rid of the English it was

necessary first to dislodge from power those men who collaborated with them.

Through the formation of the Free Officers' Organization ^{in 1942,} Nasser ^{had} created the instrument through which the revolution could be engineered. From within the organization he drew ~~the rest of~~ the men who were to make up the Revolution Command Council. According to his embassy biographer, "He hand-picked each with meticulous care and having satisfied himself as to their loyalty he began to plan with them their next moves." On July 23, 1952, the revolution took place. Farouk was expelled and the Revolution Command Council took over the government.

Nasser says that he never felt that the Army's Revolutionary Command Council was to rule for long. The Army was merely to be the vanguard of the revolution that Egypt had been waiting for so long. "I thought this role would never take more than a few hours. Then immediately would come the sacred advance behind us of the serried ranks" of progressive civilian forces. But those forces never materialized. "I felt, with sorrow and bitterness," he writes, "that the task of the vanguard, far from being completed, had only begun."

Until then, this man, according to Miss Thompson, was "Faithful, brave and pure." But, if ever, for how long? The Revolutionary regime started in business with ~~Gaibani~~ General Naguib as its head, but with Nasser ⁱⁿ maintaining the real power behind the government. General Naguib had been chosen to rule because of his Sudanese birth and his appeal to the people of the Sudan who were about to choose between joining Egypt or ^{forming} having an independent government of their own. When the Sudanese finally chose

independence, Naguib's days of usefulness were numbered. During the period of his tenure of office, however, Naguib had gained great popularity among the Egyptian masses, the extent of which Nasser, no doubt, had not foreseen. This made getting rid of Naguib a ticklish problem, indeed, but after the loss of the Sudan in 1954, no more time could be lost. If Naguib remained in power much longer, he might become impossible to control and would no doubt lead Egypt back to a parliamentary government. To Nasser, the time had come to steer Egypt back onto the course he had mapped out for it. A coup d'etat was organized, and, through some unpopular maneuvering, ^{Naguib was} ~~Nasser~~ deposed ~~Naguib~~. Men sympathizing with Naguib were placed under arrest, and Naguib, in real purge-style, was accused of plotting against the regime with the Moslem Brotherhood after someone had taken some shots at Nasser while the latter was making a speech at Alexandria. Naguib's fate was determined by a tribunal which sentenced him to ten years house arrest. By the end of 1954, Nasser had attained full control of Egypt.

To consolidate his ^{position} ~~power~~ Nasser drafted a constitution which gave him virtually absolute power. The constitution was accepted by the Egyptian people in a typical totalitarian "election" in which there was only one safe way to vote.

The Plan

If anyone has any doubts as to what Nasser has planned for Egypt, he can dispel them easily by reading through Nasser's little book. In it, in clear, undisguised words is the blueprint of the Egyptian Revolution. In reality it is a blueprint in two parts—one for Egypt's internal reform, another for Egypt's future development into a world power with special spheres of influence.

What is interesting about the new internal reforms is that they are not based on any school of social or economic philosophy. Nasser shows no bent toward socialism, communism or even free enterprise. He does not speak in terms of a social ideology. Instead, he writes briefly and superficially of the conflict of the classes, which he hopefully sees resolved through "justice." There is nothing more in this book than this very general approach. In fact, what is truly astounding about the book is Nasser's almost complete neglect of the monumental economic problems that Egypt is faced with. The explanation for this is, I believe, alarmingly simple. He is simply not interested in economics. He is far more concerned and fascinated with ideas of Arab power—which gives a fair indication of the emotional investment ^{he} ~~Nasser~~ has in his plan of conquest and how far from reality is his approach to Egypt's problems. So far, there has been an attempt to break up some of the enormous estates of the landowners and to distribute some land to the impoverished tenant farmers of Egypt. But this program has not gone very far. As for economic progress, Nasser writes: "And to be sure about our economic welfare, we asked the most

eminent professors in various fields of experience to create a program to insure the prosperity and well being of our country so that each and every individual might be certain of his daily bread. As a result, the Permanent Council for the Development of National Production was set up." With that statement Nasser brushed^u aside all preoccupation with economics. It is interesting to note that this is the only instance in which Nasser is willing to rely on other authorities^{than himself}. His rebellion does not reach into this area of life.

The real internal changes in Egypt have taken place in the institutions of government. A new constitution firmly legalizing Nasser's rule and the election of a rubber stamp parliament has been adopted. All political parties have been outlawed, save Nasser's own National Union, which rules the government in much the same way that Peron's party ruled Argentina, Mussolini's Italy, Hitler's Germany, and the Communist's Russia. The most far-reaching program of change now taking place in Egypt ~~under Nasser~~ can be summed up in the word "Egyptianization." For ~~many~~ centuries Egypt has played host to many foreign communities that have settled ^{there} ~~in Egypt~~ and prospered. These communities own homes, banks and businesses, and even though their members consider Egypt their home, they maintain their ethnic identification and sometimes the citizenship of the countries of their origin or the origin of their ancestors. The Greek community is the largest, with 80,000 from Greece itself and 10,000 ethnic Greeks from the British colony of Cyprus. Italians, Jews, Lebanese, British, and French make up, for the most part, the other foreign communities. To Nasser ~~they are not~~ ^{are they} only [^] the byproducts of imperialism, but also a constant reminder to the

indigene Arab culture that the language and culture of ^{world} power and accomplishment is the language and culture of the West. It is a form of cultural imperialism, which is much more dangerous than physical imperialism because it is so much more difficult to resist. "Sometimes," Nasser writes, "I examine the conditions of an average Egyptian family . . . in Cairo . . . the father is a turbaned farmer . . . born in the heart of the countryside. The mother is a descendant of a Turkish family. The sons are being educated at an English style school, while the daughters attend schools run on the methods of the French. And all this being backgrounded by a curious mixture of thirteenth and twentieth century ways of life.

"I consider all this, and feel a deep understanding of the confusion that besets our national life and of the disorder from which we plan escape. Then I reflect: this society will develop form, consolidate and become a strong, homogeneous and unified whole."

In many respects there is a strong resemblance between Hitler's drive to "purify" the Germans racially and Nasser's drive to "purify" Egypt culturally. One has still to see whether such purification will do Egypt more ^{harm} ~~good~~ than good--and whether it actually can be achieved.

Perhaps the most important part of Nasser's blueprint is that dealing with Egypt's role in international affairs. Nasser is not only a Pan-Arabist but he also believes that Egypt is destined to lead the entire Arab nation. It is interesting to note that Nasser is able to reconcile a nationalist policy of Egyptianization with Pan-Arabism. One is never certain what Nasser means by being Egyptian and also Arab. One suspects that Egyptianization

and Arabization are interchangeable. That perhaps is also a confusion in the Arab mind—a desire for unity, yet also a strong sense of regional differences and interests.

" . . . If anyone tells me that place for us means the political boundaries of our country, I . . . differ. . . . No country can escape looking beyond its boundaries to find the source of the currents which influence it . . . " With this ominous theme, Nasser turns his thoughts to international politics.

Above all, Nasser is very much impressed with Egypt's physical position in the world. He writes: "We cannot look at the map of the world without seeing our own place upon it, and that our role is dictated by that place."

And then further on, "It is not without significance that our country is situated West of Asia, in contiguity with the Arab states with whose existence our own is interwoven. It is not without significance, too, that our country lies in the northeast Africa, overlooking the Dark Continent, wherein rages a most tumultuous struggle between white colonizers and black inhabitants for control of its unlimited resources."

Nor is it without significance, he continues, that Egypt has become the "shelter" of Islam. Then, making a highly romantic literary reference to Luigi Pirandello's play, "Seven Players in Search of an Author," Nasser goes on to propound the theory that within the Arab world is a "role" wandering aimlessly in search of a hero. "And I do not know why it seems to me," he writes, "that this role, exhausted by its wanderings, has at last settled down, tired and weary, near the borders of our country."

Nasser sees Egypt surrounded by three "circles" in which she must act: the Arab circle, the African circle, and the Islamic circle. "There can be no doubt that the Arab circle is the most important, and the one with which we are most closely linked. . . . We are bound in this circle by a common religion." This common religion is the kernel of Pan-Arabism, yet it has far from unified the Arabs. One can easily see why, if one looks at Europe where a common religion has done nothing ^{for unity.} ~~to prevent warfare.~~ Perhaps the most significant statement Nasser makes about Arab awareness is of its origins in himself. "The first glimmers of Arab awareness began to steal into my consciousness when I was a student in secondary school. I used to go out on a general strike with my comrades every year on the second of December to protest the Balfour Declaration." This is really an important revelation, for it indicates how much of Arab awareness, Arab unity, owes itself to, of all things, Zionism. In fact, with the Balfour Declaration, the British succeeded in giving the Arabs the one collective cause which has nurtured their unity for the last forty years. Nothing else has united the Arabs since. Neither common language nor religion. Even in the heat of intramural Arab intrigues and back-stabbing, enemies and friends have been able to pause, almost religiously, to unite on some anti-Israel stand. But while there has been Arab unity on the Israel question--and even here Abdullah tried to go his independent way ^{and} ~~to~~ make peace with Israel before he was assassinated--there has been no unity on imperialism, British influence, or communism. The only other issue unifying the Arab world is Algeria.

Arab unity has tended to be based on negative forces. "The Arab states," Nasser writes, "emerged from Palestine with a common bitterness and disappoint-

ment." And that, in a sense, sums up the substance and spirit of Arab unity—a common bitterness, disappointment, fear, and frustration. ". . . I was certain that what was happening in Palestine could happen to anyone of the Arab states so long as it remained subject to the factors and forces that governed it at that time. . . . And it was clear that the foremost of these forces was imperialism. Even Israel itself is but a result of imperialism. For if Palestine had not fallen under the British Mandate, Zionism would never have been able to . . . realize a national home in Palestine."

To Nasser, Algeria is another Palestine, with its over one million French colons having dispossessed the native Arab culture from its primary place. Palestine, more than anything else, has woken up the Arabs from their long slumber and instilled in them a sense of national survival and pride which they never had or needed. It has shown them how weak they are—so weak, in fact, that another people, more highly developed and organized, ^(armed with firm legal sanctions,) could come into Palestine, and over a period of years with intense colonization and reclamation transform what was a backward Arab country into a *modern* Jewish one. In Algeria, a similar kind of transformation has been taking place for the past fifty years.

Finally, Nasser sums up Arab unity in the form of a "common struggle." "I said to myself that so long as the region is one region, sharing the same conditions and problems, and the same future (and, however he tries to change his disguise, the same enemy)—so long as this is true, why do we scatter our efforts?" The imperialists, according to Nasser, have merely

divided the Arabs in order to dominate them more easily. It is unified action which is needed to rid the region of imperialism--physical imperialism, economic imperialism, and cultural.]

"I do not doubt . . . that our common effort will achieve for us and our peoples everything we desire. For I shall always maintain that we are strong. The only trouble is that we do not realize just how strong we are."

What is Arab strength? According to Nasser, who has given more than ample thought to the matter, it is its people, united by a great religion and culture; its strategic land position at the crossroads of the world; and its bottomless oil resources. To Nasser, these are sufficient requisites to becoming a world power to be reckoned with. Certainly, not many nations have been blessed with so many advantages. Although, as irony would have it, they are the very same things that attracted the "imperialists" to the Middle East in the first place.

As for the second circle, the continent of Africa, Nasser writes: "We cannot under any circumstances remain aloof from the terrible and sanguinary conflict going on there today between five million whites and 200 million Africans. . . . We will never in any circumstances be able to relinquish our responsibility to support, with all our might, the spread of enlightenment and civilization to the remotest depths of the jungle. . . . I will continue to dream of the day when I will find in Cairo a great African institute dedicated to unveiling to our view the dark reaches of the continent, to creating in our minds an enlightened African consciousness."

That there ^{is} ~~seems to be~~ room for another imperial force in Africa is

what Nasser seems to be saying, ^{although} ~~for~~ he must know that in order to "spread enlightenment and civilization" in the jungle, he will have to displace other firmly entrenched spreaders. The way things are advancing in Africa there will hardly be room for another interloper, and certainly not enough time. Or perhaps Nasser has other motives—involving the head waters of the Nile and the Sudan? Or is it merely as he says, "because we are in Africa." Or because "the people of Africa will continue to look to us, who guard their northern gate and who constitute their link with the outside world." There is something pompous and unreal about a nation as underdeveloped, illiterate and impoverished as Egypt talking about spreading enlightenment and civilization in the jungle when there is more than enough work to do at home. However, as unreal as this idea may be, Nasser has not hesitated to send his agents into the field. And it is worth noting that Nasser's men have been working mostly in the already free African nations of Libya, Ethiopia, and the Sudan.

The third circle, "which circumscribes continents and oceans . . . is the domain of our brothers in faith"—the entire Islamic world. The germ of this idea grew out of a pilgrimage that Nasser had made to Mecca. "I stood before the Ka'ba, and in my mind's eye I saw all the regions of the world which Islam has reached. Then I found myself saying that our view of the Pilgrimage must change. It should not be regarded as only a ticket of admission into Paradise after a long life, or as a means of buying forgiveness after a merry one. It should become an institution of great political power and prestige." The Pilgrimage, in effect, should become a yearly Islamic World Parliament, a political rather than religious affair. After

seeing once more in his very active mind's eye the millions of Muslims in Indonesia, China, Malaya, Siam, Burma, Pakistan, the Middle East, and--not to be omitted--the Soviet Union, he writes: "When I consider these hundreds of millions united by a single creed, I emerge with a sense of the tremendous possibilities which we might realize through cooperation of all these Muslims . . . enabling them and their brothers in faith to wield power wisely and without limit." The most frightening aspect of this typical Nasser daydream is the idea of power without limit. It is the dream of a man who would not hesitate to use a hydrogen bomb if he had one.

That, in brief, is the Nasser plan. It is at least as ambitious as anything Hitler had in mind for Germany. Its main tenets are these: eliminate every vestige of Western influence and power in Egypt and the rest of the Middle East; bring the entire region under the leadership of Egypt; use Egypt's strategic land position to exert power over the West; control the oil resources of the region in order to control the industry of Europe; become the leader of all Africa; and finally lead the limitless power of a united Islam.

Nasser's entire preoccupation is with power--how he can get it, and how he can use it. Since this plan was put into operation three years ago, it has encountered formidable obstacles. Nevertheless, it has advanced ^{perhaps this} forward. ~~It~~ ^{be} is an opportune moment for a progress report, which can ~~be~~ best ^{be} made by surveying the methods by which the plan has been put into operation.

The Method

Implicit in any plan is a means of its execution. When Hitler decided to get rid of the Jews, for instance, he ordered his men to work out very practical methods whereby this could be accomplished. That it involved doing things of an inordinately repulsive nature did not stop him from carrying out the plan. In fact, it was the utterly repugnant and pathological nature of the plan which made people, and particularly its victims, believe that it would not really be carried out, and therefore ironically and tragically lessened resistance to its execution. In much the same way, Nasser has lessened resistance to his own plan—merely because it is so ambitious and few are willing to admit that the apprentice dictator of so weak and poor a country as Egypt can actually carry it out.

But when an architect draws up a plan for a house, he does not design what he knows is physically impossible to construct. Likewise, there is no reason to believe that Nasser does not have complete confidence that his plan can be fulfilled. His military training alone has provided him with that cold-blooded ability to think about the techniques he must use to fulfill his plan. Certainly he has learned a great deal from previous dictators. As for terrorism, he was quite impressed with the methods the extremist Jews had used to get the British out of Palestine.

The plan to overthrow the monarchy we know was worked out by Nasser himself with the aid of his fellow army conspirators. They used a great deal of what they had learned in Military College, especially in their studies of ways and means of protecting Cairo and its approaches from the ground and air forces of a theoretical enemy. They also had loyal men

feeding them information about the goings on in the Army, Palace and Cabinet. When the coup took place it went off without a hitch.

It was not too long after the Revolutionary regime had gotten in the saddle that it had to use force to subdue the opposition. An attempt on Nasser's life in 1954 brought about the ruthless suppression of the Moslem Brotherhood. A purge of the Revolutionary ranks themselves also took place after the attempted assassination and the coup against Naguib. The regime was already following the classic pattern of suppression and purge characteristic of the police state. By drafting a constitution legalizing the dictatorship, Nasser used another classic technique by which to consolidate his regime—giving it virtually complete control over every phase of Egyptian life. The new Egyptianization and nationality laws give the regime the legal power to deprive large segments of the population of their property and civil rights. Their resemblance to the Nuremburg laws of Nazi Germany cannot escape notice. In this way, not only the Jews are being forced out of Egypt, but also other foreign communities and interests.

As for preparing the Egyptian masses for their future, Nasser has not hesitated to use all the tried-and-true indoctrination techniques of the modern police state: an emphasis on the military virtues, a controlled press, a vast ingenious propaganda machine and radio system known to be organized by ex-Nazis. Various parts of the Nasser plan have been put into action simultaneously; thus Egypt has started on its road to the future fighting on several fronts at once. But to Nasser speed is of the essence. "Our salvation lies," he writes, "in maintaining our speed of movement and our initiative, and our ability to travel through two revolutions simultaneously."

Unifying the Arab world and ridding it of "imperialism" seems to be one and the same task for Nasser. It has turned out to be more difficult than he imagined. In order to unite the Arab world he has had to capitalize on Arab fears of Israel--which is the one emotion Nasser has been able to use entirely to his advantage. In the case of Jordan it was the one excuse the Syrians--Nasser's allies--could use to bring their troops into Jordan, and it was the pretext that permitted Nasser to set up an underground Fedayeen organization which could eventually be used to overthrow King Hussein. Up to the Israeli invasion of Sinai, it was the fear of Israel which made the other Arab nations look to Nasser as their protector. Nasser's plan to unite the Arab states surrounding Israel under an Egyptian military command also served conveniently as a means of infiltration in the host countries.

The first setback for Nasser, however, was far removed from the Arab-Israel dispute. It was the choice of the Sudanese to ^{be a} have their own independent state rather than join Egypt. After the failure to win the Sudan, in spite of his clever use of Naguib, Nasser concentrated on getting the British out of Suez. Terrorist methods were used against British soldiers, keeping the conflict hot until the British, with gentle persuasion from America, finally agreed to evacuate the canal zone. Once the British were out, nationalization of the canal was the next step. True, the canal would have been turned over to Egypt in 1968, but why should ~~one expect~~ Nasser to wait that long? The Suez Canal Company, after all, was merely another abhorrent example of European economic imperialism. And besides, Nasser could never hope to use the canal for Egypt's sole military and political purposes

as long as it was not completely his. And so, when Dulles withdrew his Aswan Dam offer, Nasser chose that propitious moment ~~is which~~ to do what he had planned all along.

When one stops to think of how much Nasser has tried to do with the limited political and military resources of Egypt one is amazed. By far he has one of the most active geopolitical imaginations that ever a ruler was endowed with. Consider the plan: to get the British out of Jordan, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula; to destroy the Baghdad Pact; to install pro-Egyptian governments in the Middle Eastern Arab countries; to build a unified command against Israel; to organize Fedayeen units for the purpose of terrorizing the Israelis into submission; to force the French out of Algeria. And this is only a partial list.

Let us examine his methods of ridding the Middle East of Western domination. In most of the Arab countries Nasser recognized the same political conditions that existed in Egypt: a monarchy and government that collaborates with the "imperialists." Therefore he must do for them what he has done for Egypt—that is, to bring down the governments that keep the West in, and to install a military junta which will take orders from Cairo. Naturally, in this endeavor Nasser has found ready support and aid from the Communists, who, for their own purposes, want the very same things to happen.

Nasser's clever—and not-so-clever—use of the Russians is probably the riskiest aspect of his method. There is no reason to believe that Nasser is a communist sympathizer or would any more tolerate Soviet imperialism in Egypt than he would Western. But the Soviets need Nasser as much as Nasser needs them, and therefore they are willing to work together—albeit

with a great deal of mutual suspicion (for what omnipotent system trusts another?) for the purpose of destroying Western power in the Middle East. In the long run, the Russians believe that Nasser would be a much less formidable enemy to have on their southern flank than the A-bomb toting Baghdad Pact governments. At least the Russians control the arms of the Egyptians, and anyway, it is ^{quite possible} ~~most likely~~ that Russia and Nasser have come to some sort of understanding about spheres of influence in the Middle East.

When belabored about his Russian connections, Nasser usually points out that the Communist Party in Egypt is still illegal. But one can easily see why the Russians do not mind this at all. To the Communists also first things come first, and the first item of business in the Middle East is to get the West out; then, once Nasser is in control of the region, the Russians, if they want to, will be able to take it from him in one piece. After all, where will Nasser find allies then?

Notwithstanding the substantial aid Nasser has received from the Kremlin, he has had to do most of his work in the Middle East single-handed. Until his recent retirement, number one Western "collaborationist" on Nasser's list was Nuri es-Said, the inexhaustible premier of Iraq and right-hand man of King Feisal. Both men in Nasser's eyes are no better than Farouk and his clique. Nasser has tried every means at his disposal to bring down the government of Iraq. His relentless barrage of propaganda denouncing the Baghdad Pact, his inciting the street mobs to violence, and his network of agents ^{who} have no doubt tried to organize the same kind of coup that ~~was carried out~~ ~~in Egypt~~ he himself so successfully engineered for Egypt. To all the world's surprise, however, including Nasser's, the Iraqi government has

managed to withstand his assaults.

Before the Suez invasion ^{of} Nasser's chances in Iraq were far better than they are now. He has become too involved with the Russians, and his hostility toward the West has cost Iraq too much money in lost oil royalties. Besides, the Iraqis are much closer to the Russian border than is Egypt and therefore they are that much more concerned about Russian moves. For some reason, Nasser cannot grasp this. He cannot understand the necessity of the Baghdad Pact for those nations bordering on Russia's southern flank, and he cannot understand why they are more wary of the Russians than of Western "imperialism." This applies also to Pakistan, a member of the Baghdad Pact and one of Nasser's most virulent critics in the Moslem world, particularly because of Nehru's wooing Nasser for the latter's support on the Kashmir issue. Perhaps Nasser's deal with the Russians worked immediately in his favor; but obviously he underestimated the fear of Russia among the peoples in the northern tier of the Middle East, particularly the Turks, who will never forgive him for bringing Russian power into the Mediterranean.

But it is also obvious that Nasser never intended to lean on the Russians as much as he has had to. The Israeli invasion upset the Egyptian timetable, forcing Nasser in desperation to look to the Russians for his salvation, thus precipitating the split in the Arab world. It is ironic that while the Russians were busy slaughtering the Hungarians, they were saving the Egyptians. None of this escaped the eyes and ears of the other Middle Eastern states, save Syria.

It becomes obvious to anyone who studies Nasser's methods, that he has made some serious miscalculations, miscalculations which have almost cost him

his life. That he was saved from almost certain destruction by a freak coalition between Russia and the United States merely attests to the man's uncanny luck. The speed and energy with which the U.N. came to Nasser's rescue is the kind only to be found in fiction. But history is full of such cliff hangers. Even Hitler survived a bomb put right under his nose, living to prolong an incredibly horrible war ~~another two years~~.

What about Israel? While Nasser has nowhere in "Egypt's Liberation" written of his intentions to destroy Israel, he has on occasion said as much in public; but certainly his military actions speak louder than any words. That the Arab states wish to destroy Israel goes without saying. Exactly what their plan was before the Sinai invasion is not completely known. On the eve of the Israeli attack Egypt had announced the formation of a unified command with Syria and Jordan to coordinate the Fedayeen attacks against Israel. These attacks were to be intensified during the winter of '56 and the spring of '57. Whether or not a full-scale military assault was to follow is still open to question. The Israelis say that they captured evidence to the affirmative. And of course there were the Russian arms, which, for the most part, were offensive weapons.

But the question still remains, ^{risk a war with} why ~~destroy~~ Israel? Arab vengeance for the defeat in 1948 no doubt serves enough of a motive, but people can forgo vengeance if they stand to lose even more by it. But if one carefully reads Nasser's blueprint for Egyptian power it becomes obvious why a strong independent Jewish state on Egypt's border cannot be allowed to exist. First of all, Israel's geographic position, with coasts on both the Mediterranean and Gulf of Aqaba, weakens Egypt's strategic position. If the West could use Israel for transit purposes, the Suez Canal could be avoided. Also, Israel separates

Egypt physically from the rest of the Middle East and thus makes it impossible for Nasser to use any military forces effectively in that area. Had Nasser been able to send troops into Jordan, for example, there would have no doubt been a different ending to the King Hussein story. It is pure irony that Israel should be in a position to protect the Arab states from one another.

Nasser's whole concept of Egyptian power is based on ^(his assessment of Egypt's) ~~his~~ geographic position and his ability to use that position not only against the West, but also for dominating the entire region. Israel's position therefore vastly weakens Egypt's, and that is why the ^{Aqaba} ~~Aqaba~~ blockade is of such great importance to Nasser. In addition, Israeli productivity, science, and technology threaten to make it the dominant economic power in the region. Certainly Nasser could scarcely tolerate this. Therefore, it was obvious which country was the number one obstacle to expansion of Egyptian power and in Nasser's eyes had to be eliminated. The problem was, and no doubt still is, how to destroy Israel without destroying Egypt. Nasser thought he had the answer.

He recruited an army of terrorists—the Fedayeen—from among the sullen discontented Arab refugees in Gaza. The Fedayeen were to use an almost fool-proof technique of hit-and-run terrorism. Since Israel's physical shape leave it vulnerable to such warfare, Nasser chose this as being much safer than ^{a full-scale} ~~a~~ military assault. Such an assault would have been condemned by the U.N. and would have run the danger of being defeated by the Israeli Army.

The Fedayeen were trained in terrorist techniques in Egypt and sent across into Israel to do whatever damage ^{they} ~~it~~ could. What did Nasser hope to gain by this? He hoped most of all to terrorize and demoralize the Israelis into accepting his terms and conditions of peace. This "peace", the terms of which

he has often vocalized, would oblige Israel to retreat to the borders of the original 1947 partition recommendation and also accept the return of close to a million Arab displaced persons. Once this was accomplished, the rest would be easy. Israel would become another Algeria, subjected to constant and incessant terror from within and without, since it would be impossible for the Jews to control so large an Arab minority in a crazy-quilt territory, and the Jewish state would be destroyed. This was a long-range plan, but it was the only plan, Nasser thought, that could be made to work without endangering Egypt. Nasser tried to insure himself against Israeli retaliation by stocking up on formidable arms from Russia. But again he miscalculated. He underestimated the Israeli power to strike back and again went too far in his provocations. One thing is certain, however, the Israelis did not underestimate Nasser.

There seems to be a discernible pattern to Nasser's behavior. He is moved by an overpowering self-confidence which ignores the many possible reactions to his provocations. Politically, he is a superficial thinker, who not only attributes the basest motives to all those who oppose him, but also appeals to these same motives in his followers. He has the kind of dashing cleverness that reaps him the éclat of an immediate victory, but which in time turns out quite badly. One of his great talents is the ability to use one factor or issue for more than one purpose. Take for example the Arab refugees. By promising them the return of Palestine and keeping them unsettled, he has been able to recruit among them the terrorists and subversives who can do his work of ~~simply~~ terrorizing Israel, ^{as well as} ~~but also~~ undermining the monarchies in the Arab countries. Yet this too may have backfired, for the monarchs may now decide to resettle the refugees in order to eliminate the danger inherent in

their ^{present} ~~settled~~ situation.

As for driving the French out of Algeria, Nasser again has employed hit-and-run terrorism. Here he can exercise such techniques in their best setting. A European minority lives intermingled with a large Moslem majority. It does no good for the French to guard frontiers, for the enemy is everywhere and nowhere. Nasser's terrorists have been fighting a war of nerves, making life unbearable for the populace. The outcome of this guerilla war, however, is by no means clear. When the French struck at Suez with the British, they were thinking of Algeria much more than the canal, for they know that Nasser's support of the rebels is what really sustains them.

As for subversion in neighboring countries, Nasser has used the technique ^{perfected} ~~used~~ by the Communists and Nazis--that is, making one's embassy the center of espionage and subversion. The military attaches, all trained in the art of subversion, ~~is~~ have the jobs of organizing local activity. Many of them have been caught red-handed by the host countries and expelled. ^{In} ~~On~~ November 1957 Nasser's attache in Libya was escorted to the border after he had tried to arouse mob protest in Tripoli against the attack on Egypt. His attache in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, was expelled on similar grounds, and the attache in Somalia was assassinated because of his activities. In Beirut, Lebanon, the Egyptian military attache was caught with a carload of explosives after some Western banks had been bombed, and in recent weeks Nasser's attaches in Jordan and Saudi Arabia were expelled for plotting to overthrow the governments and planning the assassinations of King Hussein and King Saud. When one thinks of that passage where Nasser speaks of "considering the assassinations of many people" and his subsequent change of heart, one realizes that he has never given

up the idea, after all.

As for combatting dissension at home, Nasser recently proclaimed an espionage law providing death sentences for persons convicted of wilful acts "jeopardizing the country's independence, unity or territorial integrity." The law also provides the death penalty or prison for rumor-mongering, insulting Nasser, distributing secret leaflets and attempting a coup. He has also put a ban on rock 'n' roll. The people of Egypt are now saddled completely and indefinitely with a totalitarian regime which will no doubt milk them dry if it doesn't lead them to disaster first. ~~In the meanwhile, the world, alerted and on guard, will make Nasser's future progress a little more difficult.~~

In spite of his many setbacks, it would be a mistake to suggest that Nasser is a beaten man or that his regime is about to collapse. His recent interviews with the press and his pronouncements and diplomatic maneuvers show him to still have considerable strength. The U.N. protects him from Israel, and he now owns the Suez Canal lock, stock and barrel. The Russians have replaced his military losses and are doing all they can to strengthen his hand. But what are his next steps? Where ^{can} ~~do~~ he go from here?

In the kind of situation that now exists in the Middle East anything can happen. There is no reason to believe that Nasser has changed his plan or given up his ambitions. His most recent setbacks in Jordan and Lebanon will make it extremely difficult for him to regain the position he held in the Arab world before Sinai, but an assassination in Jordan, a coup d'etat in Syria, or a rebel victory in Algeria may change the picture overnight. For the time being, he will be most active where the risks are smallest. Right now, Algeria

is the safest place for him to push his hand. The French are no longer in a position to retaliate directly, and in Algeria he has the support of the entire Arab world and some liberal elements in the United States and Great Britain. As for Israel, the Fedayeen have resumed somewhat limited activity, mainly planting mines on Israeli roads. It may no longer be possible to destroy Israel, but obviously he must keep her subdued and blockaded for as long as possible. To do this he can still count on the support of the Arab bloc as a whole. As for pushing the West out of the Middle East, the picture has been somewhat complicated by the appearance of the United States on the scene in the form of the Eisenhower Doctrine. It is now obvious that Nasser has much less room in which to move than he had before Sinai, and that he will have to act accordingly. No doubt his very active mind is busy working out his next move. Whatever it will be, the rest of the world will be far better prepared for it.

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